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CHURCHILL DowNs, INC. V.
THOROUGHBRED HORSEMEN'S GROUP, LLC
"ANTITRUST LIABILITY AND THE HORSE RACING INDUSTRY"
TARA N. HESTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The horseracing industry is vital to many states' economies and
cultures, but none so much as to Kentucky.' Wagering on horse races, in
the form of off-track betting, provides significant revenue for the racing
industry. In Churchill Downs, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Group,
LLC, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
discussed a potential antitrust violation by horse owners and trainers in
connection with off-track betting. Section II of this Comment discusses the
legal background of the current dispute. Section III analyzes the court's
holding and reasoning, and section IV addresses the potential implications
for horse owners, trainers, racetracks, and jockeys in Kentucky and across
the nation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act (hereinafter, the "Act"), which governs antitrust
claims, states that it is illegal to make a contract or conspire to restrain trade
or commerce. 2 Only unreasonable restraints on trade are banned by the
Act, and courts determine if "a restraint is unreasonable using either the per
se rule or the rule of reason" test, depending on the facts of the case.3
When asserting an antitrust violation, plaintiffs have a heightened standing
requirement, and must show the traditional Article III requirements of
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, and also that the injury was an
antitrust injury.4
* Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2009-2010. B.A. 2008, Georgetown College, J.D. expected May 2011, University of Kentucky
College of Law.
I GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF HORSE RACING, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF HORSE RACING (2008),
http://www.horseswork.com/pdf/FinalGovernorsTaskForceReportonHorseRacingI 21508.pdf.
2 Churchill Downs, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Group, LLC, 605 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877
(W.D. Ky. 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C. §1).
Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 877 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997); Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 2008)).
4 Id. at 878 (citing NicSand, Inc. v 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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B. The Interstate Horseracing Act
"In 1978, Congress enacted the Interstate Horseracing Act
(hereinafter, "IHA"), 15 U.S.C. § 3001-3007, . . . to protect ... smaller
racetracks and horsemen's groups" from off-track betting abuse at the
hands of larger tracks.5 As defined in the I{A, a horsemen's group is "the
group which represents the majority of owners and trainers racing there, for
the races subject to the interstate off-track wager on any racing day."6
Churchill Downs and many other racetracks earn a significant amount of
revenue from off-track betting (hereinafter, "OTB") and Advanced Deposit
Wagering (hereinafter, "ADW"). 7 ADWs operate by allowing individuals
to deposit money with an operator and then wager by telephone or over the
internet on races across the country.8 In order for OTB and ADW
establishments to obtain the right to accept wagers on a given race and
receive a simulcast of the race, they must contract with the host track to
purchase the track's "signal." 9 The tracks must then contract with the
horsemen's groups regarding the percentage of the revenue from the
signal's sale that will be paid to the horsemen.'
°
Typically, eighty percent of the pool from the OTB, ADW, and
track betting is paid to winning bettors." The remaining twenty percent,
the "takeout," is the profit divided between the tracks, OTB, ADW, and the
horsemen's groups. In order for the host track to be able to sell its signal
to the OTBs and ADWs, the track must obtain the consent of the authorized
horsemen's groups, who have the ability to veto the sale of a signal. 3
There are two horsemen's groups at the Churchill Downs racetrack:
Kentucky Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Association (hereinafter,
"Kentucky HBPA") and Kentucky Thoroughbred Association (hereinafter,
"KTA"). 14 Until recently, these two groups would give their consent to
Churchill Downs to sell signals and then Churchill Downs would
subsequently negotiate contracts for the price of the signals with the OTBs
and ADWs. 5
'Id. at 875.
6 15 U.S.C.A. §3002 (12) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010).
'Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
8 Id.
9Id.
'o Id. at 874-75.
"Id. at 874.
12 Id.
" Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
14 Id. at 873, 875.
" Id. at 875.
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III. CASE HISTORY
The Plaintiffs, Churchill Downs; Calder Race Course, Inc.; and
Churchill Downs Technology Initiatives Company (hereinafter,
"Plaintiffs"), alleged antitrust violations under the Sherman Act by the
Defendants, KTA and Kentucky HBPA, at Churchill Downs on the theory
of "price fixing perpetuated by a group boycott" in an effort to increase the
Defendants' profits.
16
In 2007, several horsemen's groups from various racetracks around
the country formed the Thoroughbred Horsemen's Group (hereinafter,
"THG") to negotiate a separate licensing agreement with all ADWs that
required the ADWs to pay the THG a license fee equal to at least one-third
of the takeout. 17 This agreement did not allow the ADWs to buy a signal
for less than one-third of the takeout; therefore, the ADWs would be forced
to pay a higher price for the signal than they currently paid, thereby
increasing the profits of the horsemen's groups. I8 The THG, acting as
representative for the horsemen's groups, stated that if the ADWs refused to
sign the licensing agreement then the individual horsemen's groups would
use their veto power under the IHA to stop the sale of the host track's signal
to the ADWs. 19 Based on the THG statements, the Plaintiffs claimed that
the ADWs were no longer able to negotiate the price they paid for signals
because the horsemen's groups continued to veto the sale of the signals
until the ADWs agreed to sign the licensing agreement. 20 The Plaintiffs
claimed that the actions of the Defendants raised prices and limited
21competition.
From October 2006 until April 2008, when this suit was filed, the
Kentucky HBPA and KTA consistently exercised their horsemen's veto on
the sale of Churchill Downs' signal because none of the ADWs agreed to
sign the Licensing Agreement.22
IV. ANALYSIS
As previously mentioned, the Sherman Act, which governs anti-
trust claims, states that it is illegal to make a contract or participate in a
conspiracy which restrains trade or commerce.23  In evaluating the
16 Id. at 877.
" Id. at 875-76. This agreement was in lieu of the agreement that the tracks negotiated with
the AWDs. Id.
'8 Id. at 876.
19 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
20 id.
21 id.
22 Id. at 876.
23 Id. at 877.
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Plaintiff's antitrust claim, the court looked at four elements: (1) standing to
bring antitrust cause of action, (2) immunity from antitrust laws, (3) the
pleading standard for an antitrust complaint, and (4) the elements of an
antitrust cause of action.24
A. Standing in Antitrust
In evaluating the Plaintiffs' antitrust allegations, first, the court
addressed the issue of standing. When asserting an antitrust violation,
plaintiffs have a heightened standing requirement and must show that the
injury is an antitrust injury, in addition to the traditional Article III
requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. 25 To qualify
for antitrust standing, the Sixth Circuit requires that the violation reduce
competition in the market and that the plaintiffs injury result from that
decrease in competition.26 The first element in evaluating standing for an
antitrust violation is the nature of the injury; namely, the complaint must
allege an anticompetitive effect on the market as a whole and not just on the
plaintiffs.27 Plaintiffs alleged there was a group boycott by the defendant
horsemen's groups through the use of their agreement to veto the sale of
signals until the ADWs signed the license agreement.28 The alleged boycott
resulted in fewer wagering opportunities because fewer signals were sold;
with fewer signals sold, the price of signals was inflated.29  The court
concluded that the inflated price harmed competition; therefore, the
allegations satisfied "the first element of antitrust standing., 30
The second element of antitrust standing requires the plaintiff
demonstrate that the antitrust violation is the only cause of the plaintiff's
injury.3' The complaint will be dismissed if it is shown that the injury
would have occurred in the absence of the antitrust violation.32 The
Plaintiffs alleged that they were injured because they were unable to sell
their signals while the horsemen's groups continued to exercise their veto.33
The court reasoned that although individual horsemen's groups could veto
24 See id. at 878-92.
25 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (citing NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d
442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007)).
26 Id. at 879 (quoting Tennessean Truckstop, Inc. v. NTS, Inc., 875 F.2d 86, 88 (6th Cir.
1989)).
27 Id. at 879 (citing Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir.
2008)). 2 
Id. at 880.
29 Id.
30 id.
31 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,
332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003).
32 Id. (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 914 (6th Cir. 2003)).
33 id,
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signal sales without the concerted action of the THG and cause similar
injuries to the tracks and the ADWs, the second element was nevertheless
satisfied because no "independent lawful cause of the injury can be
identified[.]
3 4
B. Antitrust Immunity
Having established that the Plaintiffs met the requirements for
antitrust standing, the court next determined if the IHA created immunity
for the Defendants from antitrust liability. The court noted that Congress
can provide immunity from antitrust liability by either explicitly stating that
immunity exists in a statute or by regulating the substantive area in such a
way that antitrust immunity is implied.35 However, courts are reluctant to
find implied immunity unless there is a "'clear repugnancy between the
antitrust laws"' and the statute.36 The Churchill court first concluded, with
both parties agreeing, that the [HA did not explicitly give immunity from
antitrust liability.37 Next, the court considered whether the statute provided
implied immunity.38
1. Implied Immunity
The principals of Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC v. Billing are
instructive in cases regarding implied immunity.39 In Credit Suisse, the
court found that Congress created a comprehensive regulatory scheme that
controlled the behavior of participants in a substantive area,40 and "the
comprehensive regulatory scheme was deemed a substitute for antitrust
regulation. ' 41 In Credit Suisse, antitrust immunity was implied because
Congress provided an alternative method in the statute for regulating
antitrust activity, thus eliminating the need for antitrust laws.42 However,
the provisions of the IHA do not state any alternative scheme for regulating
antitrust activity and, therefore, there is no implied immunity in the IHA's
legislative framework for antitrust liability.
43
Next, the court looked to see if implied immunity was present in
the IHA despite the fact that supervision via a regulatory scheme was not
present. The court discussed McCarthy v. Middle Tennessee Electric
34 Id. at 881.
35 Id. (citing Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007)).
36 Id. (quoting United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975)).
37 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
38 Id.
39 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 881-82.
43 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
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Membership Corp., where implied immunity was found in a situation that
was less regulated than Credit Suisse." The case involved the Tennessee
Valley Authority (hereinafter "TVA"), which was charged under 16 U.S.C.
§ 831 with "'maintaining and operating the properties now owned by the
United States."' 5  In McCarthy, "[e]lectrical cooperative members
challenged the legality of contracts between the TVA and the electrical
cooperatives. ' 6  The McCarthy court held that the "TVA was immune
from antitrust liability ... because the statute created municipal monopolies
for electrical power, which was at odds with concerns about competition.,,
47
Additionally, state law regulated the TVA's rates."8 Because a regulatory
scheme created by state and federal law was in the statute and antitrust
provisions would conflict with this existing scheme, implied immunity was
necessary in order for the statute to serve its intended purpose. 9
The IHA is distinguishable from the TVA because the purpose of
the IHA was to ensure fair compensation of horsemen in the off-track
betting market and, more importantly, the IHA did not provide standards of
regulation for the horsemen's veto.5° The court declined to extend the
implied immunity doctrine to the IA because there was not an alternative
regulatory scheme in the IHA that conflicted with the antitrust laws;
consequently, no immunity was required in order for the statute to function
as Congress intended.5
2. Extended Immunity
The court next evaluated the Defendant's final argument for
antitrust immunity based on the theory of extended immunity. This theory
states that if "a group is immune from antitrust laws, acts by a group of
individuals must also be immune as well. 52 The Defendants stated that it
is impossible for individual horsemen to comply with both the IHA and the
antitrust statutes, and, therefore, implied immunity should be extended
under the IA for the horsemen's groups.
53
The Defendants offered three cases in support of their proposition
to extend individual immunity to a group, all of which the court ultimately
"Id.
45 Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C.A. § 831 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010)).
46 Id. (citing McCarthy v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir.
2006)).
"7 Id.
48 Id. at 883 (citing McCarthy v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F.3d 399, 414
(6th Cir. 2006)).
49 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
so Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
3 id.
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distinguished on factual differences.5 4 The court stated that the Capper-
Volstead Act, the subject of Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith
Citrus Products Co. and Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass "n v. Ore-
Ida Foods, Inc., is unlike the IHA in that it provides express immunity from
antitrust liability in agricultural situations.55 Although the third relevant
case, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., dealt with implied immunity, the court in
Brown did not extend the doctrine of implied immunity but, rather, stated
that the doctrine "applied equally to employees and employers. 56
Ultimately, "none of these cases support[ed] the proposition that implied
immunity" given to an individual "extends to a group of immune
individuals. 57
The Churchill court stated that "immunity is to be implied narrowly
and only to the minimum extent necessary[,],, 58 indicating that only in very
limited circumstances would the court grant immunity for antitrust
violations where Congress had not specifically provided for it in the statute.
The court reasoned further that individual horsemen under the IA do not
need implied immunity to be extended because a veto can only be exercised
by a horsemen's group, not by an individual.59 More importantly, neither
an individual nor a horsemen's group can be liable for independently
exercising a veto under the IHA and, therefore, neither require antitrust
immunity for their actions under the IHA.60  The court only discussed
individual horsemen's groups acting independent of one another, not the
THG groups acting together to veto the sale of signals, which could have
different implications. The court stated that "[m]ere incompatibility [with
the antitrust laws], as opposed to clear repugnancy, is insufficient to find
41d. at 883-84 (The first two cases articulated by defendants, Sunkist Growers, Inc. v.
Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962) and Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining
Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1974), involved the Capper-Volstead Act,
regulating agricultural cooperatives. In Sunkist Growers, citrus growers, which joined Sunkist and
formed two separate cooperatives, were found to be not independent parties in regard to the antitrust
acts because the Capper-Volstead Act anticipated a cooperative of this size. Therefore, the
organizations were in practical effect one organization. In Treasure Valley, potato growers, which
joined larger associations to have better bargaining power with potato buyers, were protected from
antitrust liability as cooperatives acting together as one association. In the third case, Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) the NFL Players Association challenged an action by the NFL Clubs
in relation to salary floors agreed upon by the Clubs for developmental squad players. This case was
governed by the federal labor laws and the Supreme Court said that implied antitrust immunity was
necessary here to make the authorized bargaining process effective. However, the Court said this was
just a "multi-employer bargaining" and did not involve "groups joining together into larger groups" as
was the case with the horsemen's groups.).
5' Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (citing Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &
Smith Citrus Products Co, 370 U.S. 19 (1962); Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 217 (9th Cir. 1974)).
56 Id. at 885 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)).
571d.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60Id.
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implied immunity.', 61 Although implied immunity from antitrust violations
did not exist in the 1IA, the court left the door open for Defendants to
demonstrate that without implied immunity the rights granted under the
lHA could not be properly exercised, in which case a grant of implied
62immunity would be necessary.
C. Pleading Standard for an Antitrust Complaint
Defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed
under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly for failure to state a claim of relief 63
Twombly states that a heightened pleading standard applies to antitrust
complaints, requiring a plausible, not just conceivable, complaint. 64  A
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to lead to a reasonable expectation that
after the discovery process, evidence of an illegal agreement will be
revealed. 65  An antitrust complaint cannot just state the elements of the
cause of action but must also give facts to support the elements, although
the facts need not be detailed.66 The facts, however, must give rise "to a
plausible finding of an agreement that unreasonably restrains trade. 67
There are two ways to find that a cause of action is plausible: a per se
violation, or a violation under the rule of reason approach.68 The Plaintiffs
alleged a per se antitrust violation with their theory that the Defendants are
"in a group boycott for the purpose of price fixing"69 because the boycott
has a "'predictable... anticompetitive effect.'
70
D. Elements of an Antitrust Cause ofAction
There are three elements needed to sustain an antitrust cause of
action: "(1) the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy (2)
affecting interstate commerce (3) that imposes an unreasonable restraint on
trade. 71  To satisfy the first element, a plaintiff must show evidence of
"'the terms of membership of the conspiracy and the method adopted to
effectuate its ends.' 72  The Kentucky HBPA joined the THG, which
represented horsemen's groups from 40 other racetracks in addition to
61 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 886.
62 Id.
63 id.
6 Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
65 Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007)).
661d. at 887.
67 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
6 id.
69 id.
70 Id. (quoting Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008)).
" Id. at 887-88.
72 Id. at 888 (citation omitted).
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Churchill Downs in November 2007. 73 As evidenced by the licensing
agreement, the THG proposed to the ADWs that the groups represented by
the THG wanted signals to be sold for a higher price, thereby increasing the
amount of money the groups received.74 The licensing agreement set a
minimum price for which the ADWs could purchase a racetrack signal, and
the presence of this agreement led the court to conclude that a conspiracy
between the horsemen was plausible, thus satisfying the first element.75
The second element requires a plaintiff to define the relevant
product and geographic markets for the defendant's actions.76 The
Plaintiffs met this burden by defining the geographic market as the United
States, which was appropriate because individuals nation-wide were able to
place wagers on races using the off-track betting system.77 The Plaintiffs
defined the product market as the right to receive signals and accept wagers
at other locations besides the host track; therefore, the court found that
Plaintiffs satisfied the second element.78
The third element is satisfied if it can be proven that "the agreement
had an anticompetitive effect."79  The Plaintiffs asserted that the
Defendants' concerted use of their veto and the licensing agreement
provided evidence of a group boycott, with the ultimate goal being to
increase the profits the horsemen's groups received from the sale of
signals. 80 "These facts . . . illustrate[d] a plausible finding of a group
boycott to raise prices, which shows an anti-competitive effect."
Therefore, the court found that all three elements of an antitrust claim were
supported by the facts alleged in the complaint.82
Even though the elements of the cause of action were satisfied,
there was still a question as to whether or not there was an antitrust
violation under either the per se or rule of reason approach. The court
chose to focus on the per se approach because it applies to "practices [that]
by their nature have a 'substantial potential for impact on competition[,]"' 83
such as the group boycott alleged by the Plaintiffs in the present case. A
per se violation requires proof of: "(1) two or more entities engaged in a
conspiracy, combination or contract, (2) to effect a restraint or combination
prohibited per se . . . , (3) that was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
73 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
74 Id.
76 id
77 id.
78 Id.
79 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
so Id. at 888-89.
81 Id. at 889.
8 id.
83 Id. at 890 (quoting F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433
(1990)).
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antitrust injury."84 These elements are similar to the elements needed to
sustain an antitrust cause of action; "[c]ommercially motivated group
boycotts are per se violations because 'the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects is clear and the possibility of countervailing procompetitive effects
is remote."'
85
Traditionally, boycotts with the purpose of price-fixing (which the
Plaintiffs alleged occurred when the horsemen's groups joined the THG and
used a concerted veto) have been held to be per se antitrust violations.86
The court did not explicitly say if the Defendants' actions in the present
case were a violation under the per se approach; however, the court elected
to only perform a per se analysis at this time. If this analysis proves to be
unviable following discovery and the presentation of additional information
by the Plaintiffs, the court will then perform a rule of reason analysis.87
Under the IHA, tracks and horsemen's groups are joint sellers of
the signal, for which tracks compete to get the best price from ADWs.88
Although the horsemen are not the actual sellers of the signal, their actions
may, through the rights granted to them by the IHA, influence or increase
the price of the signal "in a way that restrains commerce. 89 If the ADWs
choose not to accept the terms of the agreement set forth by the horsemen's
groups, they will be unable to purchase signals, which is "synonymous"
with per se violations.90 The court ultimately declined to rule on whether or
not the Defendants' actions were an antitrust violation, stating that many
factors could influence the outcome. 9' At a later date, when the Plaintiffs
have completed discovery and presented all of their evidence, the court will
decide if an antitrust violation has actually occurred.92  Following the
aforementioned discussion, the court evaluated the Plaintiffs other claims,
which are not relevant to this Comment. 93
Id. (citations omitted).
85 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 890. (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985)).
MId. at 891 n.26.
87 id.
8 Id. at 891.
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
92 Id. at 891-92.
93 Defendants moved for dismissal of count I] of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which
"alleges breach of both (1) the contract's anti-assignment provisions and (2) its exclusive representation
provision." Churchill Downs, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 892. Plaintiffs said that appointing THG to
negotiate on behalf of the horsemen's groups conflicted with the horsemen's groups' "obligation to
serve as exclusive representative for purposes of the [HA." Id. The court dismissed this claim because
the Plaintiffs admitted in their response brief that Defendants did not violate this provision. Id. at 892
n.28. With regard to the exclusive representation provision, both parties agreed it "does not prohibit the
horsemen's group from appointing an agent [THG] to negotiate on its behalf." Id. at 892. The court
focused its attention on whether the actions of TGH constituted an agency relationship, which is
permissible under the IHA, or something more. Id. The court held that THG was not exercising a veto
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V. IMPLICATIONS
The court in Churchill did not explicitly say whether the defendants
committed an antitrust violation but left the issue open for a decision
following discovery. If, after further discovery, the court concludes that
Defendants' actions constitute an antitrust violation, there could be far-
reaching consequences for horse owners, trainers, race tracks, and jockeys.
Horsemen's groups would be prevented from uniting to negotiate prices if
their intended purpose would have an anti-competitive effect on the market.
This would mean that horsemen's groups would not have much leverage to
negotiate if they felt the price that the racetracks were demanding was not
satisfactory for their signal and, in turn, not paying the horsemen's groups
enough. If the defendants' actions are found to be an antitrust violation,
this would leave racetracks in control of the price the horsemen are paid for
their contribution to the off-track betting market. Horsemen's groups
would not be able to organize in any boycott by exercising their veto in a
concerted matter, and their power would be limited because one horsemen's
group acting alone has little influence.
It is also possible that the defendants' actions will not be found to
violate antitrust laws. This outcome would give horsemen's groups
tremendous power within the industry. Revenues from off-track betting are
essential to the racing industry. This result would allow horsemen to set
their own price for their share of the takeout, and could have a disastrous
consequence if the horsemen's groups became greedy. If horsemen's
groups began using their veto power to demand larger amounts of the
takeout, the race tracks and off-track betting sites would lose vast sums of
money, forcing many to close. The horsemen could, in a large part, control
the future of the racing industry, and the racetracks would have no choice
but to give the horsemen the price they demanded or else they would be
unable to sell their signal at all.
Neither one of these alternatives would provide an optimal result,
and perhaps the best solution would be for Congress to amend the text of
the IHA to ensure that neither of these harsh results becomes a reality.
on Kentucky HBPA's behalf and that it was clear that THG was representing Kentucky HBPA's
interests and not their own. Therefore, the court concluded that THG was merely acting as an agent for
Kentucky HBPA, which is permissible under the IHA, and the exclusive representation provision was
not violated. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Off-track betting within the horse racing industry will have
continued significance. The court in Churchill declined to rule if the
defendants' actions were an antitrust violation, stating that there were many
factors which could influence the outcome. At a later date following
discovery, the court will decide if an antitrust violation has occurred. The
court's final ruling in Churchill, determining if the defendants' actions are
an antitrust violation, will have far reaching implications and will influence
the future success of the racing industry, particularly because of the
importance of OTBs and ADWs. Regardless of how the court rules, either
the tracks or the horsemen will be left with very little power, while the
other side will have nearly complete control. If the defendants' actions are
found to be an antitrust violation, tracks and off-track betting organizations
will have the power to set the price of signals and determine the share given
to horsemen. If the defendants' actions are found not to be an antitrust
violation, horsemen's groups will have nearly unlimited capability to set a
price for their share of the takeout, and will have the option to use their veto
under the IHA if not given the price demanded.
[Vol. 2 No. 2
